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Abstract: The energy sector is characterized by market and monopoly activities. Monopoly activities 
include network activities, transmission and distribution of electricity, and transport and 
distribution of natural gas. For this reason, the revenue of the network activities is defined 
as allowed income, and it is under the control of the national energy regulator. In Croatia, 
this is the Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency. The allowed revenues of the network sys-
tem operator in the Croatian energy sector are defined by the methodologies for individual 
network activities, which are based on the method of eligible costs. Network activities are 
usually capital-intensive activities. Capital cost is an element of the eligible cost method and 
is accounted for as a weighted average cost of capital (WACC). WACC affects the allowed 
revenue of the network system operator and the network tariff. It depends on the interest 
rates on debt capital, the risk-free rate, the market risk premium and the corporate tax rate. 
Changing the interest rate on the capital market, which also depends on the credit risk of the 
country, affects both the change in WACC and the change of tariffs for transport / transmis-
sion of energy. Amortization and operating expenses of the network operator, approved by 
the energy regulator, also have a significant impact on allowed revenues. The impact of the 
WACC change on the allowed revenue and network tariffs of network system operators has 
a different impact on the network tariffs, which depends on the structure of the eligible costs 
of a particular network system operator. Changing WACC affects the changes in tariffs of the 
network system operator. The aim of the paper is to determine how an interest rate change 
affects the WACC and how the change in WACC affects the change in the allowed revenue 
and the network tariff of the gas transport operator and the transmission of electricity in Cro-
atia. The paper will analyse the tariffs of electricity transmission and natural gas transport 
in Croatia and compare them with those in the European Union. 
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Introduction
Energy infrastructure operators are characterized by capital intensity and long pe-
riods of return on investment. In order for the price of use of the infrastructure to 
be within a reasonable frame, the regulatory framework should define appropriate 
and efficient methods of economic regulation. Thus, it should cover reasonable and 
justifiable cost of operations. The goal is to secure uninterrupted supply and quality 
of service and reasonable return on investment. At the same time, the regulatory 
framework also aims at the optimization of investment costs where the outcome is 
a moderate tariff for access and use of infrastructure, which balances interests of 
owners and users of infrastructure (Gelo et al., 2018). The EU decided to make a 
legal framework and operation conditions of natural monopolies in the energy sec-
tor. Thus, the regulation of energy activities was introduced with the goal to protect 
consumer and investor interests by protecting the invested capital, as well as obtain-
ing the framework that is common in completely open market competition. At the 
same time, to obtain independency and transparency of the processes, the states or-
ganize regulatory bodies that define relationships among all participating parties in a 
non-discriminatory and transparent way (Gelo, Štritof, 2005). Through its legislation 
(directives), the EU initiated the process of opening its electricity and gas market to 
competition in 1996. The Directive consisted of common rules for the EU internal 
market in electricity and natural gas. The process was continued with new directives 
in 2003 and 2009. The aim of the directives was to create a competitive integrated 
market in electricity and natural gas in the EU. Further development of the market 
continued in 2016 with the adoption of a new package of various measures (Clean 
Energy for All Europeans), thereby completing the establishment of the integrated 
market and creating the Energy Union (Beus at al., 2018). The regulation of monop-
oly activities in electricity and gas sector in Croatia was introduced in 2001, when 
the first set of energy laws was passed, and furthermore in 2002, when the national 
regulatory authority was established. The national regulatory authority was in charge 
of regulating transmission and distribution activities in both sectors (Družić et al., 
2012). Energy sector regulation is established with the aim to ensure the functioning 
and improvement of the energy sector, and it is based on the principles of indepen-
dency, transparency and the protection of customers and investors in the energy sec-
tors. The regulation of energy activities is implemented pursuant to the Act on the 
Regulation of Energy Activities, and it is in accordance with the EU directives.1 The 
operating body for implementing the regulation in the energy sector is the national 
regulator – Croatian Energy Regulatory Agency (HERA). The directives determine 
the aims, and national laws determine the organization and responsibility for meeting 
the aims. Therefore, the regulators’ roles are determined by national laws. The role 
of the regulator in the EU member states varies, taking into consideration market 
specificities and the initial state at the time when market principles were introduced. 
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HERA’s roles and activities, according to the Act on the Regulation of Energy Activ-
ities, can be divided into:
•	 administrative (issuing previous orders for preferential energy producers, issuing 
orders on acquiring preferential producer status, issuing licenses for performing 
energy activities) 
•	 advisory (providing opinions and proposals for improving acts which determine 
market functioning, consumer protection) 
•	 regulatory (enacting methodologies, tariff items, tariff amounts for regulated ac-
tivities, resolving complaints for connection conditions, analysing work of regu-
lated energy companies, approving investment plans)
Basic tasks of the regulator are defining tariff systems which include the follo­
wing:
1.  the determination of the regulatory method which then leads to the determination 
and control of costs,
2.  the determination of tariff items which are a result of allocation of costs to cus-
tomers.
The paper analyses the Methodology for determining the amounts of tariff items 
for gas transport and the Methodology for determining amounts of tariff items for 
electricity transmission. The methodology for determining the amounts of tariff 
items for gas transport refers to the energy company in charge of gas transport, which 
is Plinacro. The methodology for determining the amounts of tariff items for elec-
tricity transmission refers to the energy company in charge of energy transmission, 
which is the Croatian Transmission System Operator (HOPS). Natural gas transport 
is a regulated energy-related activity performed as a public service. PLINACRO Za-
greb is the transport system operator in Croatia, and it is owned by the Croatian 
state. Plinacro is in charge of the monitoring, maintenance, development and con-
struction of the entire gas transmission system, and of other activities necessary for 
the technical functioning of the system. Plinacro operates 2700 km of high­pressure 
gas pipelines (HERA, 2016). Electricity transmission is a regulated energy activity 
performed as a public service. In Croatia, Croatian Transmission System Operator 
(abbreviated HOPS) provides the public service of electricity transmission and is 
responsible for the operation, management, maintenance, development and construc-
tion of the transmission network and cross­border transmission lines, as well as for 
ensuring the long­term capability of the network to satisfy reasonable requirements 
for the transmission of electricity. HOPS is the sole electricity transmission system 
operator in the Republic of Croatia and the owner of the entire Croatian transmission 
network. It is owned by Hrvatska elektroprivreda, national energy company, which 
deals with the generation, distribution and supply of electricity. HOPS operates 7700 
km of transmission network (HERA, 2016).
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Regulation methodology of network system operators
With the aim to ensure energy market functioning, national regulators establish and 
implement regulatory policies through their activities, i.e. through enacting methodol-
ogies and tariffs. The methodologies determine the regulation model, i.e. the model of 
allocating costs and revenues to the network operator. Methodologies are based on a 
regulatory approach, i.e. the method, and they can be (Gelo and Štritof, 2005): 
•	 rate of return regulation (Cost plus / Rate of return) 
•	 incentive regulation (which can have three forms):
 o maximum price (Price cap)
 o maximum revenue (Revenue cap)
 o hybrid model (Price cap / Revenue cap)
With the rate-of-return method, the system operator is allowed all eligible operat-
ing expenses increased by the margin which reflects the corresponding return on in-
vested capital. This method is also called cost-of-service or cost-plus regulation. The 
allowed revenue of the operator consists of eligible operating expenses (OPEX) and 
eligible capital expenditure (CAPEX). Allowed revenues and tariffs are determined 
for a regulation period which, as a rule, is one, or sometimes two years, after which 
an audit is carried out, and all elements for the following year are determined. Taking 
into consideration certain flaws of this method, a new method (Joskow, 2007) was 
developed – incentive regulation. The primary advantage of the incentive regulation 
with regard to the rate­of­return regulation is incentivising more efficient business 
performance of regulated companies, whereby the regulator seeks to approximate 
the price of use of infrastructure to optimal operating expenses in the long run. With 
the price cap method, the basic modern method of the incentive regulation is the 
revenue cap method. The price cap method determines the maximum price, i.e. the 
tariff, which the operator is allowed to apply during the regulation period which most 
commonly lasts from three to five years, and sometimes even longer. The revenue cap 
method determines the maximum revenue which the operator is allowed to generate 
during the regulation period. In addition to the mentioned methods, a series of hy-
brid models which combine basic regulation models is also applied in the regulatory 
practice. Apart from the mentioned regulation methods, there are many various in-
struments for service quality regulation which regulators also apply (Pérez­Arriaga, 
2013), but this is not the subject of this analysis.
Selecting the regulation method is based on the regulatory approach which takes 
into consideration specificities and the development level of the energy market in a 
regulatory area. Therefore, the methods vary from country to country in the EU. The 
cost-plus method is used for energy transmission in Belgium. The incentive-based 
method is used by the Czech Republic, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The 
revenue cap or price cap method is mostly used by eastern EU countries, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, but also Sweden. A method combination is used by Finland, 
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Greece, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK, whereas the cost-plus method is used 
in Croatia. For gas transport, the revenue cap method is used by the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, SE and Slovenia, whereas the price 
cap method is used by Latvia and Lithuania. The rate-of-return method is used by 
Greece and Estonia, whereas other countries use a combination of methods. Croatia 
uses a revenue cap method based on incentive regulation.
This paper analyses two similar energy network activities, gas transport and elec-
tricity transmission, i.e. the allowed revenue of the gas transport system operator 
(Plinacro) and the electricity transmission system operator (HOPS). The analysis is 
based on the adopted methodologies which are the base for determining the allowed 
revenue and tariff. Taking into account the complexity of methodologies, as well as 
numerous elements defined with them, the analysis is directed at a very important 
element where energy companies have no impact. These are interest rates which are 
a result of trends and conditions on the capital market of the Republic of Croatia, i.e. 
the credit rating of the Republic of Croatia, and which are a reflection of the Croa-
tian economy. Since network energy activities are capital intensive, the impact of the 
change in interest rates on the financial market is significant.
Regulation methodology of gas transport system
The methodology for determining the amounts of tariff items for gas transport is 
based on the incentive regulation model. The planned allowed revenue AR Pt is deter-
mined for a year according to the formula:














DP Pt   –  is the planned allowed revenue in a regulation year t (HRK),
OPEXPt  –  are the planned operating expenses in a regulation year t (HRK),
APt         –  is the planned amortisation of regulated funds in a regulation year t (HRK),
PRO Pt    – is the planned return on regulated funds in a regulation year t (HRK),
PVδt        –  is a part of the difference between the revised allowed revenues and the 
generated revenues in the year T-1 and in the previous years of the regu-
lation period expressed in a regulation year t (HRK),
PPRIK
 P
t – is the planned revenue from the connection fee and the increase in con-
nection capacity in a regulation year t (HRK),
PNU
 P




t     –  is the planned other operating revenue which does not refer to the core 
business of the transport system operator (hereinafter: planned other op-
erating revenue), in a regulation year t (HRK).
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PROPt     -  is the planned return on regulated funds in a regulation year t (HRK), 
ROpros
P
t   -  is the planned average amount of regulated funds in a regulation year t 
(HRK), 
WACC   -  is the WACC amount for the regulation period (%). 
WACC is a variable which affects the planned allowed revenue of the transport 
system operator.
For the purpose of calculating tariff items, a simplified equation will be used for 
the reference tariff item of working energy for all customers which uses the total 
revenue in the ratio with the total transmitted energy in the system operator. Thus, we 
avoid the tariff item breakdown for each customer category, and the simplified model 
illustrates the average reference item: 
where:
DP Pt  –  is the planned allowed revenue in a regulation year t (HRK),
E  – is the parameter which will be shown, in this simplified model, as the 
energy transmitted through the system (MWh)
Regulation methodology of electricity transmission system 
The methodology for determining the amounts of tariff items for electricity trans-
mission is based on the basic principle that the revenue should cover total expenses 
which are based on total eligible expenses and generated revenue.
The total expenses UTP are determined for a year according to the formula: 
UTP=TPpos+TPkap-TRnsu-TRppk
where: 
TPpos  –  are the operating expenses (OPEX)
TPkap  –  are the capital expenditure (CAPEX)
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TRnsu  –  are the expenses of providing non-standard services
TRppk  –  are the revenues from allocating cross-border capacities
For the purpose of this analysis, the variables which vary from year to year, i.e. 
TRnsu and TRppk, are zero. These variables do not have a significant impact on the 
total operating expenses. Thus, we obtain a simplified model for further analysis. 
Capital expenditure equal to:
TPkap=PRim+A
where:
PRim  –  is the return on regulatory assets
A  –  is the amortisation
The return on regulatory assets PRim equals to:
where:
WACC –  is the weighted average cost of capital
RI  –  is the average value of the regulatory assets
From the methodology elements, it is noticeable that WACC is a variable which 
affects the level of operating expenses, as well as the revenue, i.e. tariffs, of the trans-
mission system operator.
For the purpose of calculating tariff items, a simplified equation is used for the 
reference tariff item of working energy for all customers which uses the total revenue 
in the ratio with the total transmitted energy in the system operator. A simplified 
model illustrates the average reference item:
where:
UTP  – are the total operating expenses
E  –  is the parameter which will be shown, in this simplified model, as the 
energy transmitted through the system (MWh)
Weighted average cost of capital – WACC
The most widely used approach for estimating the cost of equity is the Capital As-
set Pricing Model (CAPM) (Frontier Economics). CAPM revolutionized modern fi-
allowed revenue, and the change in interest rates does not affect their change. Thus, we obtain 
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WAC  – is the weighted average cost of capital
RI – is the average value of the regulatory assets
From the methodology elements, it is noticeable that WACC is a variable which 
affects the level of operating expenses, as well as the revenue, i.e. tariffs, of the transmission 
system operator.
For the purpose of calculating tariff items, a simplified equation is used for the 
reference tariff item of working energy for all customers which uses the total revenue in the 
ratio with the total transmitted energy in the system operator. A simplified model illustrates 
the average reference item:
Ts=𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝐸𝐸
where:
UTP – are the total operating expenses
E – is the parameter which will be shown, in this simplified model, as the energy 
transmitted through the system (MWh)
Weighted average cost of capital – WACC 
The most widely used approach for estimating the cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Frontier Economics). CAPM revolutionized modern finance. Developed in 
the early 1960s by William Sharpe, Jack Treynor, John Lintner and Jan Mossin, the model 
provided the first coherent framework for relating the required return on an investment to the 
risk of that investment (Perold, 2004). It displays the relationship between risk and expected 
return for a company’s assets. The capital asset pricing model provides a theoretical structure 
for the pricing of assets with uncertain returns (Bollerslev at al., 1988). This model is used 
throughout financing for calculating expected returns for assets while including risk and cost 
of capital. The attraction of CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing 
predictions about how to measure risk and the relation between expected return and risk 
(Fama and French, 2004). The CAPM model is based on the assumption of a perfect and fully 
efficient market, which, of course, does not exist in practice. However, CAPM is still widely 
used in applications, such as estimating the cost of equity capital for (energy) companies and 
evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. 
The cost of capital is one of the most important factors that energy regulators, and 
companies, have to estimate. With the regulatory assets values of the Croatian transmission 
and gas networks approaching 1 billion EUR, even small changes in the allowed return on 
asset base can have a significant impact on customers’ bills. Estimating the overall cost of 
capital using CAPM involves the following steps (Crew and Parker, 2006): first, the risk-free 
interest rate is estimated. The second step involves estimating the company-specific debt 
premium. The third step then involves estimating the markets’ valuation of equity risk – the 
equity risk premium. The fourth step is to estimate the risk associated with the specific 
regulated activity. The fifth step involves weighting together the cost of debt and the cost of 
equity to produce an overall weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, it is necessary 
to decide whether to set the cost of capital on pre-tax or capital gains taxes.
WACC calculation 
For calculating the cost of equity, the most widely used regulatory approach is chosen, as 
elaborated in (Brounen et al., 2004). In the methodologies, WACC is calculated according to 
the formula: 
WACC= 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒(1−𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑) * 
𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷 + 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 ∗
𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷
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nance. Developed in the early 1960s by William Sharpe, Jack Treynor, John Lintner 
and Jan Mossin, the model provided the first coherent framework for relating the 
required return on an investment to the risk of that investment (Perold, 2004). It dis-
plays the relationship between risk and expected return for a company’s assets. The 
capital asset pricing model provides a theoretical structure for the pricing of assets 
with uncertain returns (Bollerslev at al., 1988). This model is used throughout financ-
ing for calculating expected returns for assets while including risk and cost of capital. 
The attraction of CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions 
about how to measure risk and the relation between expected return and risk (Fama 
and French, 2004). The CAPM model is based on the assumption of a perfect and 
fully efficient market, which, of course, does not exist in practice. However, CAPM 
is still widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of equity capital for 
(energy) companies and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios.
The cost of capital is one of the most important factors that energy regulators, 
and companies, have to estimate. With the regulatory assets values of the Croatian 
transmission and gas networks approaching 1 billion EUR, even small changes in the 
allowed return on asset base can have a significant impact on customers’ bills. Esti-
mating the overall cost of capital using CAPM involves the following steps (Crew and 
Parker, 2006): first, the risk­free interest rate is estimated. The second step involves 
estimating the company­specific debt premium. The third step then involves estimat-
ing the markets’ valuation of equity risk – the equity risk premium. The fourth step 
is to estimate the risk associated with the specific regulated activity. The fifth step in-
volves weighting together the cost of debt and the cost of equity to produce an overall 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, it is necessary to decide whether 
to set the cost of capital on pre-tax or capital gains taxes.
WACC calculation
For calculating the cost of equity, the most widely used regulatory approach is cho-
sen, as elaborated in (Brounen et al., 2004). In the methodologies, WACC is calculat-
ed according to the formula:
where:
D –  is the total debt
E  – is the total equity
re  –  is the cost of equity (%)
rd  –  is the cost of debt (%), and
pd  –  is the corporate tax rate (%)
RI – is the average value of the regulatory assets
From the methodology elements, it is noticeable that WACC is a variable which 
affects the level of operating expenses, as well as the revenue, i.e. tariffs, of the transmission 
system operator.
For the purpose of calculating tariff items, a simplified equation is used for the 
reference tariff item of working energy for all customers which uses the total revenue in the 
ratio with the total transmitted energy in the system operator. A simplified model illustrates 
the average reference item:
Ts=𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝐸𝐸
where:
UTP – are the total operating expenses
E – is the parameter which will be shown, in this simplified model, as the energy 
transmitted through the system (MWh)
Weighted average cost of capital – WACC 
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interest rate is estimated. The second step involves estimating the company-specific debt 
premium. The third step then involves estimating the markets’ valuation of equity risk – the 
equity risk premium. The fourth step is to estimate the risk associated with the specific 
regulated activity. The fifth step involves weighting together the cost of debt and the cost of 
equity t  produce an overall weighted aver ge cost of capital (WACC). Finally, it is necessary 
to decide whether to set the cost of capital on pre-tax or capital gains taxes.
WACC calculation 
For calculating the cost of equity, the most widely used regulatory approach is chosen, as 
elaborated in (Brounen et al., 2004). In the methodologies, WACC is calculated according to 
the formula: 
WACC= 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒(1−𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑) * 
𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷 + 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 ∗
𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸+𝐷𝐷
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The cost of debt is defined as the average interest rate on liabilities. However, a 
very common approach in estimating the cost of debt is estimating the risk­free rate 
on which country­specific debt premium is added (Ajodhia and Hakvoort, 2005). A 
Croatian methodology defines the post­tax WACC.
The cost of equity or yield on equity after taxation is determined:
re=rf+(rm-rf)◊β
where:
rf  –  is the risk­free rate
rm  –  is the expected return on the market
(rm-rf)  –  is the market risk premium
β  –  is the measure of the relative (or non­diversifiable) risk of the company or 
industry 
The risk­free investments and the return obtained from them exist only as a theo-
retical abstraction. In practice, such investments with minimum risks are investments 
in government securities. The market risk premium implies that any additional risk 
taken by an investor should be rewarded with an interest rate higher than the risk­
free rate. The difference between the market return and the risk­free rate of return is 
a risk premium. Risk premiums may be calculated for a particular security, a class 
of securities, or a market. The equity β (beta) coefficient is essentially a measure of 
price volatility of a company’s shares in comparison to the market index. In case of 
a high beta, the company’s share prices will tend to oscillate more than the market 
index (β is greater than 1), and in case of a low beta, the company’s share prices will 
tend to oscillate less than the market index (β is lower than 1). A standard procedure 
for estimating betas is to regress share returns against market returns. The slope of 
the regression corresponds to the beta of the share and measures the riskiness of 
the share (Štritof et al., 2009). The beta is very often estimated by using relatively 
straightforward statistical parameters:  
β= (covs,m)/(varm)
where covs,m is the covariance of the company’s share prices with the market prices 
and varm is the variance of the market prices.
In essence, funding through the owner’s capital would be possible in case when 
the profitability of a regulated entity is sufficient to cover risk­free rates of return 
and the individual risk premium based on the market risk. This is secured by using 
CAPM. However, when a regulated comapny is not listed on a liquid market, direct 
estimation of the β coefficient is not possible. Thus, regulators often use comparisons 
to similar companies in other markets and other regulatory regimes. For example, 
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in Argentina this is recognized through the legal framework, which defines the rate 
of return on regulatory assets. The estimation has to be based on comparison with 
other sectors with similar risk within the country and internationally. In addition, in 
regulatory practice, the β coefficient and other WACC elements are determined in 
a reverse procedure, as a result of an acceptable WACC level. (Pardina at al., 2008; 
Družić et al., 2012)
The weighted average cost of capital is a variable which depends on the inter-
est rates on the capital market, variability coefficient of shares and regulatory ap-
proach related to the equity and debt capital. Interest rates are different for each state, 
debt­to­equity ratios are different for each regulatory area, variability coefficient of 
shares depends on the company activity type, i.e. the risk, so the β is different for the 
gas transport system operator and the electricity transmission system operator. From 
the elements of WACC calculation, a different WACC amount can be expected for 
different states and different activities.
A comparative review of WACC calculation elements and the WACC amount for 
gas transport system operators of chosen EU member states is shown in Table 1.
Table 1 WACC comparison for different EU natural gas transporters
Parameter Croatia Germany Poland Finland Czech R. France Slovakia average
Risk­free rate rf 2.75% 3.80% 5.42% 1.82% 4.60% 2.00% 4.01% 3.49%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 4.80% 4.55% 4.80% 5.00% 6.40% 5.00% 3.00% 4.79%
Variability coefficient of 
energy company sharesb 0.54 0.32 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.58 0.3 0.41
Cost of equity re 5.34% 9.05% 8.73% 6.80% 8.54% 10.40% 6.00% 7.84%
Cost of debt capital rd 3.92% 3.80% 6.42% 3.62% 4.91% 2.60% 5.13% 4.34%
Equity in total capital 
E/(E+D) 50.00% 40.00% 58.00% 80.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 54.00%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 50.00% 60.00% 42.00% 20.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 46.00%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 15.82% 19.00% 26.00% 19.00% 34.43% 20.00% 21.75%
WACC Weighted average 
cost of capital before tax 5.22% 5.90% 8.95% 5.99% 8.29% 6.50% 6.04% 6.70%
Source: Mapping power and utilities regulation in Europe; HERA 2018.
The average WACC for gas transport system is 6.7%, and it varies from country to 
country. Croatia has the lowest WACC (5.22%), and Poland (8.95%) has the highest. 
WACC calculation is determined by various parameters shown in the table. Param-
eters which are defined with financial characteristics of a certain financial market 
have different ranges. Interest rates on loans vary from 3.62% to 6.42%, the risk­free 
interest rate varies from 1.82% to 5.42%, and the market risk premium from 3.00% 
to 6.40%. The variability coefficient of shares is in the range between 0.3 and 0.58, 
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and the corporate tax rate between 15.82% and 34.43%. The parameter which is de-
termined by the regulator is the debt­to­equity ratio. The ratio is in the range between 
80% : 20% and 40% : 60%.  
If the debt capital could also change with respect to a decrease in interest rates, 
which depends on the indebtedness of the energy company, the weighted average cost 
of capital would also change, and the return on the allowed revenue would decrease 
as well, which would eventually lead to a decreased allowed revenue and the average 
tariff item.
The same analysis was carried out for calculating WACC and the WACC amount 
for electricity transmission system operators in the same countries (Table 2).
Table 2 WACC comparison for different EU electricity transmission system operators
Parameter Croatia Germany Poland Finland Czech R. France Slovakia average
Risk­free rate rf 2.75% 3.80% 5.42% 1.82% 4.60% 4.20% 4.01% 3.80%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 3.75% 4.55% 4.80% 5.00% 6.40% 4.50% 3.00% 4.57%
Variability coefficient of 
energy company shares β 0.38 0.32 0.4 0.4 0.35 0.33 0.3 0.35
Cost of equity re 4.13% 9.05% 8.73% 5.59% 8.05% 10.92% 6.00% 7.50%
Cost of debt capital rd 3.36% 3.80% 6.42% 1.82% 4.91% 4.80% 5.13% 4.32%
Equity in total capital 
E/(E+D) 40.00% 40.00% 58.00% 40.00% 60.00% 40.00% 40.00% 45.43%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 60.00% 60.00% 42.00% 60.00% 40.00% 60.00% 60.00% 54.57%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 15.82% 19.00% 24.50% 19.00% 34.43% 20.00% 21.54%
WACC Weighted average 
cost of capital before tax 4.03% 5.90% 8.95% 3.06% 7.92% 7.25% 6.04% 6.16%
Source: Mapping power and utilities regulation in Europe; HERA 2018b.
WACC for electricity transmission system ranges from 3.06% to 8.95%. The pa-
rameters vary from country to country. Interest rates on loans vary from 1.82% (Fin-
land) to 5.42% (Poland). The risk­free interest rate varies from 1.82% to 5.42%, and 
the market risk premium from 3.00% to 6.40%. The variability coefficient of shares 
ranges between 0.3 and 0.38, and the corporate tax rate between 15.82% and 34,43%. 
The debt­to­equity ratio allowed by the regulator ranges between 60% : 40% and 
40% : 60%.
WACC varies depending on the activity and the characteristics of the regulatory area, 
i.e. the state, and influencing parameters are from financial markets and regulatory.
The analysis of the impact of the financial market condition on the WACC change
The condition on financial markets affects the changes in interest rates. In addition, 
it can be expected that Croatia’s entrance into the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the acceptance of euro as a single currency will reduce the interest rate because 
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the risk premium is one of the basic determinants of interest rates. With the entrance 
into the EMU, a country’s risk is inevitably reduced due to the country’s increased 
credibility because it is now supported by the European Central Bank (ECB) (Gos-
podarstvo Hrvatske, 2016). The change in interest rates affects the expected return 
on the market, i.e. the cost of equity and the debt interest, i.e. the cost of debt capital, 
which are elements for calculating WACC. Since the expected return on the market is 
the basis for calculating equity, and the interest at which companies were indebted is 
the basis for calculating debt capital, the assumption is that they change in the same 
proportions as the changes in interest rates on a capital market. The impact of the 
change in the expected return on the market and the cost of debt capital on WACC 
will be analysed in continuation, as a consequence of changes in interest rates on the 
Croatian financial market.
The impact of the expected return on the market changes on WACC
The impact of the change in the expected return on the market on equity is ob-
served with the assumption that the change in the expected return on the market has 
no influence on the debt capital, i.e. that the company has no new debts, that it does 
not refinance its existing bank debts, and that it has debts with a fixed interest rate. 
The analysis was carried out with the change impact in the range of +/- 10%, i.e. +/- 
20%. The gas transport analysis was carried out first (Table 3).
Table 3 The impact of the expected return on the market changes on WACC for gas 
transport
Parameter WACC -20 WACC -10 Value WACC +10 WACC +20
Risk­free rate rf 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75%
Expected return on the market rm 6.04% 6.80% 7.55% 8.31% 9.06%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 3.29% 4.05% 4.80% 5.56% 6.31%
Variability coefficient of energy company 
shares β 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Cost of equity re 4.53% 4.93% 5.34% 5.75% 6.16%
Cost of debt capital rd 3.92% 3.92% 3.92% 3.92% 3.92%
Equity in total capital E/(E+D) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00%
WACC Weighted average cost of capital 
before tax  4.72% 4.97% 5.22% 5.47% 5.71%
Source: authors’ calculation
The increase in the expected return on the market of 10% and 20%, results in the 
increase in WACC for gas transport from 5.22% to 5.47%, and 5.71%, whereas the de-
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crease in the expected return on the market of 10% and 20%, results in the decrease 
in WACC for gas transport from 5.22% to 4.97%, and 4.72%, i.e. the relative increase/
decrease in the expected return on the market of 10% and 20% results in the increase/
decrease in WACC of 4.7%, i.e. 9.5%.
The same analysis for electricity transmission was carried out in the continuation, 
with the same sensitivity analysis of the change (Table 4)
Table 4 The impact of the expected return on the market changes on WACC for 
electricity transmission system operators
Parameter WACC -20 WACC -10 Value WACC +10 WACC +20
Risk­free rate rf 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70%
Expected return on the market rm 5.16% 5.81% 6.45% 7.10% 7.74%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 2.46% 3.11% 3.75% 4.40% 5.04%
Variability coefficient of energy company 
shares β 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
Cost of equity re 3.63% 3.88% 4.13% 4.37% 4.62%
Cost of debt capital rd 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36% 3.36%
Equity in total capital E/(E+D) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00%
WACC Weighted average cost of capital 
before tax 3.79% 3.91% 4.03% 4.15% 4.27%
Source: authors’ calculation
The increase in the expected return on the market of 10% and 20%, results in 
the increase in WACC for electricity transmission from 4.03% to 4.15%, and 4.27%, 
whereas the decrease in the expected return on the market of 10% and 20%, results in 
the decrease in WACC for electricity transmission from 4.03% to 3.91%, and 3.79%, 
i.e. the relative increase/decrease in the expected return on the market of 10% and 
20% results in the increase/decrease in WACC of 2.9%, i.e. 5.8%.
The impact of the change in the cost of debt capital on WACC
The impact of the change in the cost of debt capital will be observed with the as-
sumption that the changes in interest rates on the market have no impact on equity, 
i.e. the analysis is carried out only with the aim to determine the partial impact of the 
change in the cost of debt capital on WACC. The analysis was carried out with the 
change impact in the range of +/- 10%, i.e. +/- 20%. The gas transport analysis was 
carried out first (Table 5).
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Table 5 The impact of the change in the cost of debt capital on WACC for gas trans-
port
Parameter WACC -20 WACC -10 Value WACC +10 WACC +20
Risk­free rate rf 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 2.75%
Expected return on the market rm 7.55% 7.55% 7.55% 7.55% 7.55%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.80%
Variability coefficient of energy company 
shares β 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Cost of equity re 5.34% 5.34% 5.34% 5.34% 5.34%
Cost of debt capital rd 3.14% 3.53% 3.92% 4.31% 4.70%
Equity in total capital E/(E+D) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00%
WACC Weighted average cost of capital 
before tax 4.83% 5.02% 5.22% 5.41% 5.61%
Source: authors’ calculation
The increase in the cost of debt capital of 10%, i.e. 20%, results in the increase 
in WACC for gas transport from 5.22% to 5.41%, and 5.61%, whereas the decrease 
in the cost of debt capital of 10% and 20% results in the decrease in WACC for gas 
transport from 5.22% to 5.02%, and 4.83%, the relative increase/decrease in the cost 
of debt capital of 10% and 20% results in the increase/decrease in WACC of 3.8% 
and 7.5%. 
The same analysis for electricity transmission was carried out in the continuation, 
with the same sensitivity analysis of the changes (Table 6).
Table 6  The impact of the change in the cost of debt capital on WACC for electricity 
transmission
Parameter WACC -20 WACC -10 Value WACC +10 WACC +20
Risk­free rate rf 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70%
Expected return on the market rm 6.45% 6.45% 6.45% 6.45% 6.45%
Market risk premium (rm – rf) 3.75% 3.75% 3.75% 3.75% 3.75%
Variability coefficient of energy company 
shares β 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
Cost of equity re 4.13% 4.13% 4.13% 4.13% 4.13%
Cost of debt capital rd 2.69% 3.02% 3.36% 3.70% 4.03%
Equity in total capital E/(E+D) 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
Debt in total capital D/(E+D) 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00%
Corporate tax rate pd 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00% 18.00%
WACC Weighted average cost of capital 
before tax 3.62% 3.83% 4.03% 4.23% 4.43%
Source: authors’ calculation
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The increase in the cost of debt capital, i.e. the reference interest rate on CNB 
loans of 10% and 20%, results in the increase in WACC for electricity transmission 
from 4.03% to 4.23%, and 4.43%, whereas the decrease in the cost of debt capital 
of 10% and 20% results in the decrease in WACC for electricity transmission from 
4.03% to 3.83%, and 3.62%, the relative increase/decrease in the cost of debt capital 
of 10% and 20% results in the increase/decrease in WACC of 4.9% and 9.8%. 
It is evident that the changes in expected return on the market, as well as the cost 
of debt capital in the same amount of +/-10%, i.e. +/-20%, result in different changes 
of WACC for the gas transport system and the electricity transmission system. The 
impact of the change in the expected return on the market is larger on the gas system 
operator, whereas the change in the cost of debt capital is larger on the electricity 
system operator.
The differences in WACC change arise from economic and regulatory differences 
in parameters for calculating tariffs for gas transport and electricity transmission.
The differences in economic parameters arise from the differences in the times 
when the tariffs were established because the tariffs were not established at the same 
time, and financial markets had different conditions at the moments when the tariffs 
were established. Regulatory differences are a consequence of regulatory approach 
for gas transport and electricity distribution in the amount of the interest rate at which 
the companies were indebted and debt­to­equity ratio. The debt­to­equity ratio of 
50% : 50% was accepted for the gas transport system, whereas the debt­to­equity 
ratio of 40% : 60% was accepted for electricity transmission.
By analysing the amounts of the impact of the changes in the expected return on 
the market, as well as the cost of debt capital on WACC, it is evident that the impact 
of the change in the cost of debt capital is more significant in comparison to the im-
pact of the change in the expected return on the market.
The change in the cost of debt capital simultaneously affects both equity and debt 
capital, i.e. the expected return on the market and the cost of debt capital, therefore, 
they should be observed together.
If the interest rates on the financial market are decreasing, the regulator should 
react and decrease the expected return on the market which decreases the return on 
equity. The cost of debt capital is a result either of the real interest rate on a loan, 
or the reference interest rates on the Croatian National Bank (CNB) debts in case if 
the energy company has a higher interest rate on debts than the CNB reference rate. 
This motivates the energy company to become indebted under the most favourable 
conditions on the financial market. If the interest rates on the financial market are 
increasing, energy companies should react and ask for the increase in the expected 
return on the market, i.e. the return on equity, and the increase in the interest rate on 
debts referring to the increase in the reference interest rate on the CNB debts.
The simultaneous impact of the change in the expected return on the market, as 
well as in the cost of debt capital on total (equity and debt) capital results in:
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•	 The increase in the expected return on the market, as well as in the cost of debt 
capital of 10% and 20% results in the increase in WACC for gas transport from 
5.22% to 5.66%, and 6,11%, whereas the decrease in the expected return on the 
market, as well as in the cost of debt capital of 10% and 20% results in the de-
crease in WACC for gas transport from 5.22% to 4.77%, and 4.33%. 
•	 The increase in the expected return on the market, as well as in the cost of debt 
capital of 10% and 20% results in the increase in WACC for electricity transmis-
sion from 4.03% to 4.35%, and 4.67%, whereas the decrease in the expected return 
on the market, as well as in the cost of debt capital of 10% and 20%, results in the 
decrease in WACC for electricity transmission from 4.03% to 3,71%, and 3,39%. 
Comparative analysis of the allowed revenue
The change in the expected return on the market and in the cost of debt capital caused 
the change in WACC on the total capital, and the change in WACC caused the change 
in the revenue on regulatory assets, i.e. capital expenses and allowed revenues for the 
gas transport system and total operating expenses for electricity transmission, i.e. the 
change in average tariff items.
The impact of the change in the expected return on the market and in the cost of 
debt capital of +/-10%, i.e. +/-20% on WACC, the return on regulatory assets (PRI= 
APt + PRO
 P
t), allowed revenues and the average tariff item for gas transport is shown 
in Table 7.   
Table 7 The impact of WACC changes on allowed revenues and the average gas 
transport tariff (mil HRK)










t TS ∆ TS
-20% 158,058 112,256 2,327,471 4.33% -17.04% 212,992 -8.86% 483,306 -4.11% 0.01790 -4.11%
-10% 158,058 112,256 2,327,471 4.77% -8.52% 223,340 -4.43% 493,654 -2.05% 0.01828 -2.05%
Value 158,058 112,256 2,327,471 5.22% 0.00% 233,688 0.00% 504,002 0.00% 0.01867 0.00%
+10% 158,058 112,256 2,327,471 5.66% 8.52% 244,035 4.43% 514,349 2.05% 0.01905 2.05%
+20% 158,058 112,256 2,327,471 6.11% 17.04% 254,383 8.86% 524,697 4.11% 0.01943 4.11%
Source: authors’ calculation (HERA, 2018)
The change in the expected return on the market and in the cost of debt capital 
of ­20% and ­10%, i.e. 10% and 20% on the capital market results in the change in 
WACC for gas transport of -17.04%, -8.52%, 8.52% and 17.04%, with the change in 
the revenue on regulatory assets of -8.86, -4.43%, 4.43% and 8.86% of allowed reve-
nues and average tariff items of -4.11%, -2.05%, 2.05% and 4.11.
The impact of the change in the expected return on the market and in the cost of 
debt capital of +/-10% and +/-20% on WACC, the return on regulatory assets, allowed 
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operating expenses and the average tariff item for electricity transmission is shown 
in Table 8.   
Table 8 The impact of WACC changes on allowed revenues and the average electric-
ity transmission tariff (mil HRK)
∆rm + ∆rd TPpos Amort.
regulatory 
assets WACC ∆ WACC TPkap ∆TPkap UTP ∆ UTP TS ∆ TS
-20% 1,215,536 345,167 4,840,000 3.39% -15.95% 509,043 -5.76% 1,724,579 -1.77% 0.10145 -1.77%
-10% 1,215,536 345,167 4,840,000 3.71% -7.97% 524,587 -2.88% 1,740,123 -0.89% 0.10236 -0.89%
Value 1,215,536 345,167 4,840,000 4.03% 0.00% 540,132 0.00% 1,755,668 0.00% 0.10327 0.00%
+10% 1,215,536 345,167 4,840,000 4.35% 7.97% 555,676 2.88% 1,771,212 0.89% 0.10419 0.89%
+20% 1,215,536 345,167 4,840,000 4.67% 15.95% 571,220 5.76% 1,786,756 1.77% 0.10510 1.77%
Source: authors’ calculation (HERA, 2018b)
 
The change in the expected return on the market and in the cost of debt capital 
of ­20% and ­10%, i.e. 10% and 20% on the capital market results in the change in 
WACC for energy transmission of -15.95%, -7.79%, 7.79% and 15.95%, with the de-
crease in capital expenditure (return on regulatory assets) of -5.76%, -2.88%, 2.88% 
and 5.76%, and allowed operating expenses and average tariff items of -1.77%, 
-0.89%, 0.89% and 1.77%.
The impact of the change in the expected return on the market and in the cost 
of debt capital on WACC is different for the gas transport system and the electricity 
transmission because the debt-to-asset ratio and the cost of debt capital are different 
due to the difference in times at which the companies were indebted and in the mo-
ments when the tariff items were established by the regulator. The impact is larger 
on the gas system operator (Plinacro). Therefore, we conclude that the change in the 
interest rate has a more dominant impact on the change in the equity for observed 
operators.
The WACC change is not proportional to the change in the allowed revenue on 
regulatory assets / capital expenditure for the gas transport system and electricity 
transmission, with is a consequence of a different proportion in the return on regula-
tory assets and amortisation in the allowed revenue on regulatory assets /capital ex-
penditure for the gas transports system and electricity transmission. A larger impact 
is on the system operator with a smaller amortisation proportion, and a larger return 
proportion in the allowed revenue on regulatory assets / capital expenditure.
The change in the allowed revenue on regulatory assets /capital expenditure and 
the total allowed revenue / average tariff item are not proportional for the gas trans-
port system and electricity transmission due to a different proportion of operating ex-
penses for the gas transport system and the electricity transmission system. A larger 
impact is on the system operator with a larger proportion of capital expenditure in the 
allowed revenue / total operating expenses.
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Conclusion
The changes in the expected return on the market and in the cost of debt capital 
affect the change in WACC, and the WACC amount depends on the debt­to­equity 
ratio of each system operator analysed. A larger impact is seen in larger equity 
proportions.
The change in WACC results in the change in the return on regulatory assets / the 
cost of capital, and the change amount depends on the proportion of amortisation in 
regulatory assets. The impact is larger when the amortisation and regulatory assets 
ratio is smaller.
The change in the return on regulatory assets / the cost of capital results in the 
change in the allowed revenue / total operating expenses and average tariff items, and 
the change amount depends on the proportion of capital expenditure in the allowed 
revenue / total operating expenses. The impact is larger when the proportion of capi-
tal expenditures in the allowed revenue / total operating expenses is larger.
The change in the interest rates on the capital market will have a different impact 
on the expected return on the market and the cost of debt capital, which will have a 
different impact on the regulated companies because the change impact depends on 
the capital structure of the companies and the level of capital expenditure in the total 
cost.
The gas transport system operator and the electricity transmission operator have 
different debt­to­equity ratios, a different amortisation rate and capital expenditure 
shares in the allowed revenue / total operating costs, thus they have different effects 
of the changes in the expected return on the market and the cost of debt capital on the 
allowed revenue / total operating costs and average tariff items. 
ENDNOTES
1 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity (SL. L 211, 14. 8. 2009.), Directive 2009/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (SL. L 
211, 14. 8. 2009.).
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